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Can a Distant Relative Allow the Government Access 
to Your DNA?  
 
The Fourth Amendment Implications of Law Enforcement’s 
Genealogical Search for the Golden State Killer and Other Genetic 
Genealogy Investigations 
 




This Article considers the advent of genetic genealogy, used by law 
enforcement in capturing the Golden State Killer suspect and in other cold 
cases. In these investigations, police used genetic information obtained 
from the open source genealogy site, GEDmatch, to build vast family trees 
spanning the entire country and several generations in order to locate 
suspects whose DNA matched that left at a crime scene. This Article 
analyzes the Fourth Amendment implications of government use of such 
powerful technology to explore such sensitive information as DNA. The 
conclusion the Supreme Court could reach, should it be called upon to 
examine the privacy issues involved in such intrusions, would vary 
depending on which avenue of Fourth Amendment analysis it chose to 
pursue. Maryland v. King, Court precedent on government collection of 
DNA, is so narrow that it provides little guidance on the issues presented 
by genetic genealogy. Instead, the Court could consult its recent ruling in 
Carpenter v. United States, which limited the third party doctrine that had 
previously nullified privacy expectations in shared information. If it relied 
on Carpenter, the Court would likely prohibit government downloads from 
genealogy sites without a warrant. Further, the Court could view 
individuals’ uploads of genetic information onto open source genealogy 
sites as amounting to consent to view the DNA shared with all relatives. 
The Court might therefore apply its third party consent precedent, which, in 
relying on widely shared societal expectations, would likely prevent 
warrantless collection of genetic information from genealogy sites. The 
Court could, however, view police visits to genealogy sites as government 
searches that occurred after private intrusions. If the Court chose this 
approach, it could rule that law enforcement is free to collect the DNA 
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information because it is only viewing information already exposed by 
private parties. Finally, the Court could see law enforcement’s use of 
genetic genealogy as an issue of standing, as recently analyzed in Byrd v. 
United States. Application of Byrd’s property rights definition of standing 
would likely enable the government to admit genetic evidence since 
suspects lack the power to exclude others from open source sites. Thus, 
although some Fourth Amendment doctrines would forbid warrantless 
collection of DNA information, the government could likely rely on either 
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Introduction 
 
How well do you know your relatives? Can you name every cousin, 
uncle, or great grandparent? Would you base your right to privacy on the 
whims of every one of your blood relations? Perhaps there is a “black 
sheep” in your family who continually runs afoul of the law. Maybe there 
is a flaky uncle always looking for shortcuts or a grandchild who suffers 
from drug addiction. Moreover, there are likely many distant relatives 
whose very existence is unknown to you. Would you risk the privacy of 
your most personal information, housed in your deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA), on this person’s judgment? 
On National DNA Day, Sacramento District Attorney Anne Marie 
Schubert announced the arrest of Joseph James DeAngelo, alleging he was 
the Golden State Killer,1 believed responsible for 12 killings, 50 rapes, and 
100 burglaries from 1974 and 1986.2 To catch their quarry, police used 
crime scene DNA to make a partial match with the “DNA of a relative on 
the open-source genealogy website GEDmatch.”3 Officials then 
painstakingly constructed “25 family trees containing thousands of 
relatives” in order to trace “the killer’s great-great-great grandparents, who 
lived in the early 1800’s.”4 Investigators dug through “census records, 
newspaper obituaries, gravesite locators, and police and commercial 
databases” to whittle the possible suspects down to DeAngelo.5 District 
Attorney Schubert accurately characterized law enforcement’s efforts as 
 
 1. Ray Sanchez, Elizabeth I. Johnson, Steve Almasy & Alanne Orjoux, After 
Searching for more than 40 Years, Authorities Say an Ex-cop Is the Golden State Killer, 
CNN (Apr. 27, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-
development/index.html. 
 2. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His 




 3. Sarah Zhang, How a Genealogy Website Led to the Alleged Golden State Killer: 
Powerful Tools are Now Available to Anyone Who Wants to Look for a DNA Match, Which 
Has Troubling Privacy Implications, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/science/archive/2018/04/golden-state-killer-east-area-rapist-dna-genealogy/ 
559070/. 
 4. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
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finding “the needle in the haystack.”6 “The answer was always going to be 
in the DNA,”7 she concluded. 
Law enforcement have every reason to be satisfied with its apparent 
success in capturing the “clever” and “sadistic” criminal8 variously known 
as the “East Area Rapist,” the “Original Night Stalker,” the “Golden State 
Killer,”9 the “Diamond Knot Killer,” and the “Visalia Ransacker.”10 Erika 
Hutchcraft, an investigator with the Orange County District Attorney’s 
Office, considered the Golden State Killer’s “[v]ery cold, very violent” 
crimes to be “some of the most horrific [she’s] had to investigate.”11 
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department Detective Carol Daly deemed 
this criminal “the most heinous rapist I had ever known.”12 The killer 
“planned meticulously,” calling victims to learn their routines,13 casing 
homes, cutting phone lines, and even turning off air conditioners “so he 
could hear every sound.”14 Such careful planning enabled his attacks to be 
“bizarre, cruel, and long-lasting.”15 When he was once “cornered” in a 
backyard with police dogs swarming the area, “he just disappeared into 
thin air.”16 Police, in finally capturing such a dangerous and elusive 
suspect, can rightly celebrate the innovation and dedication leading to such 
a significant achievement. Moreover, law enforcement can report other 
recent successes in cases long unsolved; the genetic genealogy employed in 
the Golden State Killer case has already been used to bring other notorious 
suspects to justice.17 
 
 6. Sanchez et al., supra note 1. 
 7. Aja Romano, DNA Profiles from Ancestry Websites Helped Identify the Golden 
State Killer Suspect: He Wasn’t the First Criminal to Fall to Familial DNA Matching, and 
He Won’t Be the Last, VOX (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/ 
4/27/17290288/golden-state-killer-joseph-james-deangelo-dna-profile-match. 
 8. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 9. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 10. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 11. Sanchez et al., supra note 1. 
 12. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Joseph Serna, Richard Winton & Sarah Parvini, As a Young Cop, Golden State 
Killer Suspect Was Aloof, Ambitious, ‘Always Serious,’ L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2018, 3:00 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-golden-state-cops-20180501-story.html. 
 15. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 16. Serna et al., supra note 14. 
 17. Kyle Swenson, Undercover Cops Grabbed a DJ’s Chewing Gum. It Helped Crack 
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While the stakes in tracking down the Golden State Killer and other 
cold-case suspects are particularly high, the Fourth Amendment privacy 
concerns involved in government exploration of DNA websites are equally 
significant.18 DNA, after all, is the genetic blueprint of our bodies that is 
embedded in the nucleus—the core—of each cell in the human body.19 The 
genetic material in every cell “carries the full sequence of your DNA, 
including the mutation pattern that makes it uniquely yours.”20 DNA holds 
the secret to such personal details as one’s Neanderthal ancestry, the 
potential for afflictions with rare diseases, and paternity.21 One expert 
warns, “[f]or a non-trivial percentage of us, there really are scary things in 
our genomes.”22 In certain circumstances, DNA is coveted by companies, 
insurers and police and can be considered “the most valuable thing you 
own.”23 
The analytical approach the Court chooses to examine government 
exploration of DNA on genealogical sites will determine how it decides the 
Fourth Amendment issues triggered by this new intrusion. Therefore, after 
Part II reviews the definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” and the 
Court’s warrant requirement. Part III examines the Golden State Killer 
investigation, and Part IV analyzes the paths the Court might take in 
deciding the Fourth Amendment issues concerning genetic genealogy. Part 
IV discusses Maryland v. King’s Fourth Amendment consideration of 
government DNA collection,24 and the Court’s third party doctrine, which 
has traditionally limited the privacy expectations of those who share 
 
m=.7abdb34dabac; April Tinsley: DNA Snares Man in Indiana Girl’s 1988 Murder, BBC 
NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44851825. 
 18. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 442 (2013). 
 20. Maggie Fox, What You’re Giving Away with Those Home DNA Tests: It’s the Most 
Valuable Thing You Own, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017, 6:46 AM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/health/health-news/what-you-re-giving-away-those-home-dna-tests-n824776. 
 21. Id.; see also Patrick Cain, Privacy Risks Lurk in DNA Tests, Experts Warn, GLOBAL 
NEWS (Aug. 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://globalnews.ca/news/2879276/privacy-risks-lurk-
in-dna-tests-experts-warn/. 
 22. Fox, supra note 20. 
 23. Id.; see also Cain, supra note 21. 
 24. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
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information. In addition, this section considers Carpenter’s latest word on 
the third party doctrine, and its potential, dramatic effect on the Fourth 
Amendment privacy of the relatives of those who upload information to 
genealogy sites.25 It then explores third party consent based on an 
assumption of risk and shared social expectations, and its potential impact 
on the official use of genealogical sites. The Court could approach 
government genetic genealogy as a state intrusion that occurs only after a 
private search has been performed, thus, triggering precedent that assesses 
an official probe by reference to the scope of an earlier private invasion. 
Finally, since the Court might question whether a person could even claim 
a Fourth Amendment violation from government exploration of a relative’s 
DNA, this article explores whether a suspect could have “standing” or the 
right to contest an official visit to a particular genealogy site. The standing 
discussion will consider the Court’s most recent case on this issue, Byrd v. 
United States.26 
 
The Fundamentals of Fourth Amendment Protection 
Against Unreasonable Searches  
 
 The Definition of a “Fourth Amendment Search” 
 
     The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” 
of individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”27 In Katz v. United 
States, the Court defined a “search” as a government intrusion on a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.28 In Katz, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) caught Katz “transmitting wagering information by 
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal 
 
 25. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 26. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court 
has defined “searches” in two ways: (1) as a government intrusion on a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy as defined in Katz, and (2) as a physical occupation of private 
property for purposes of gaining information as defined in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 404–05 (2012). Jones explained, “The Government physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical 
intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. As there is no evidence in the Golden State Killer 
case that government officials physically visited genealogical organizations to collect 
information, Jones’ physical occupation test is beyond the scope of this article. For the same 
reason, the analysis of Fourth Amendment “seizures” is beyond the scope of this article. 
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statute.”29 The FBI had obtained Katz’s side of a telephone conversation by 
bugging his phone booth.30 When the parties argued over whether the 
government’s eavesdropping by an electronic device attached to the outside 
of the phone booth31 constituted a “physical penetration of a 
constitutionally protected area,” the Court rejected this formulation of the 
issue as “misleading.”32 The focus on “whether or not a given ‘area,’ 
viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’” deflected attention 
away from the question of whether a person sought to preserve privacy, 
even in a publicly accessible area.33 Katz concluded that a person who 
occupies a phone booth, “shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that 
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he 
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.” It fell to 
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, to provide the definition of a 
Fourth Amendment “search:” 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ”reasonable.”34 
The Court has repeatedly employed Katz’s definition of a search, as 
crafted by Justice Harlan, for five decades to determine whether searches 
have occurred in such diverse situations as government entry into burned 
buildings,35 barns,36 bookstores,37 and bus bins.38 The resulting importance 
of Katz can be seen in the fact that the Court has deemed this definition of 







 29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 350–51. 
 33. Id. at 351. 
 34. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 35. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984). 
 36. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 298 (1987). 
 37. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985). 
 38. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000). 
 39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
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 The Warrant Requirement 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all but reasonable searches and 
seizures.40 Although reasonableness is “the ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment,” the Constitution itself provides no yardstick for 
measuring what is and is not reasonable.41 The Court worried that simply 
deeming an official intrusion “reasonable,” without tying this conclusion to 
“some criterion of reason,” would cause protection under the Fourth 
Amendment to “approach the evaporation point.”42 The Court also noted 
that the Fourth Amendment “was in large part a reaction to the general 
warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and 
had helped speed the movement for independence.”43 The Framers 
included the “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause” provision 
to ensure that an objective magistrate “might weigh the need to invade that 
privacy in order to enforce the law.”44 The Court, therefore, recognized 
what came to be known as the warrant requirement, which generally 
mandated officers obtain a warrant before making a search.45 
Riley v. California reaffirmed the Court’s warrant requirement. In 
Riley, officers accessed information on a cell phone and a smart phone.46 
The Court in Riley refused to allow a search of these phones as part of a 
search incident to arrest, instead flatly ruling, “get a warrant.”47 Riley 
explained, “[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to 
discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally 
requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.”48 If police fails to obtain a 
warrant, the search is presumed unreasonable unless “it falls within a 
specific exception to the warrant requirement.”49 
Carpenter v. United States, decided in 2018, repeatedly referenced the 
warrant requirement.50 The Court noted, “our cases establish that 
 
 40. In a pertinent part, the Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
 42. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969). 
 43. Id. at 761. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). 
 46. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2840–41. 
 47. Id. at 2495. 
 48. Id. at 2482. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018). 
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warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where a search is 
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing,” and, therefore, “[i]n the absence of a warrant, a search is 
reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant 
requirement.”51 Thus, the warrant mandate, articulated by the Court as 
early as 1925, still limits police discretion today.52 
 
The Search for the Golden State Killer Suspect and  
Other Investigations  
 
The Golden State Killer was a cold-blooded “serial predator” who 
elaborately planned his attacks.53 Before “closing in for the kill,” he would 
terrorize his victims with such strange behavior as breaking into the home 
to take women’s underwear, making hang-up phone calls, or leaving 
drawings on a bedroom window “that appeared to have been written in 
‘bodily fluids.”54 He “stalked his victims through drainage ditches” and 
returned to one neighborhood so many times that its residents slept in 
shifts.55 He wore a mask and blindfolded and gagged his victims.56 
In pursuing its suspect, the investigators themselves became equally 
careful and inventive. Paul Holes, a cold case expert who had worked as an 
inspector for the Contra Costa County District Attorney, spent some seven 
years using “open source” genealogy websites to locate the Golden State 
Killer suspect.57 Holes first used “Ysearch.org” to generate a “weak match” 
with a 73-year-old man in Clackamas County, Oregon.58 The man willingly 
 
 51. Id. at 2213. The Carpenter Court reiterated, “we have held that official intrusion 
into (a reasonable expectation of privacy) generally qualifies as a search and requires a 
warrant supported by probable cause.” Id. 
 52. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). 
 53. Avi Selk, The Most Disturbing Parts of the 171-page Warrant for the Golden 
States Killer Suspect, WASH. POST (June 2, 2018), https://www.washington post.com/news/ 
post-nation/wp/2018/06/02/the-most-disturbing-parts-of-the-171-page-warrants-for-the-gold 
en-state-killer-suspect/?utm_term=.d4870987d966. The search warrant affidavits for this 
case can be viewed at: http://www.sacda.org/files/9415/2789/1272/P_v_DeAngelo_Redact 
ed_Search_Warrant_Final.pdf [hereinafter Search Warrant]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Sanchez et al., supra note 1. 
 57. Matthias Gafni, Here’s the ‘Open Source’ Genealogy Website that Helped Crack 
the Golden State Killer Case, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.mercur 
ynews.com/2018/04/26/ancestry-23andme-deny-assisting-law-enforcement-in-east-area-rapi 
st-case/. 
 58. Id. 
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provided a DNA sample, which established his innocence.59 After this 
setback, Holes visited other jurisdictions that had suffered the Golden State 
Killer’s crimes in order to obtain DNA to use at a different genealogy 
website, GEDmatch.60 
GEDmatch is an “open-source genealogy website” based in Florida 
“that pools raw genetic profiles that people publicly share to find long-lost 
relatives.”61 GEDmatch differs from commercial genealogy sites such as 
23andMe and Ancestry.com, which charge a fee to “millions of customers 
wanting detailed information on their family, lineage and ethnicity.”62 
23andMe and Ancestry.com sell testing kits that require customers to 
supply a tube of saliva.63 These direct-to-consumer sites then “work very 
hard to protect their customers’ privacy.”64 A spokesperson for 23andMe 
declared that it had “never given customer information to law enforcement 
officials,” and that the company did “not share information with employers 
or insurance companies, ever, under any circumstance.”65 
GEDmatch does not follow the direct-to-consumer sites’ model. 
Instead of forming a commercial and confidential relationship with 
consumers, it invites anyone to upload DNA profiles already generated by 
the commercial sites.66 Hobbyists researching their genealogy have 
uploaded “roughly a million distinct DNA sets” onto GEDmatch.67 The 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; Richard Winton, Tracey Lien, Paige St. John & Benjamin Oreskes, The First 
Step in Finding Golden State Killer Suspect: Finding His Great-great-great-grandparents 
on Genealogy Site, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
golden-state-dna-match-20180427-story.html. 
 61. Gafni, supra note 57. 
 62. Justin Jouvenal, Mark Berman, Drew Harwell & Tom Jackman, Data on a 
Genealogy Site Led Police to the ‘Golden State Killer’ Suspect. Now Others Worry About a 




 63. Zhang, supra note 3. 
 64. Emily Shapiro, What to Know About the Privacy of Your DNA in Wake of ‘Golden 
State Killer’ Suspect’s Arrest, ABC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
privacy-dna-wake-golden-state-killer-suspects-arrest/story?id=54777919. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a 
Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html. 
 67. Jouvenal et al., supra note 62. In contrast, “23andMe has more than 5 million 
customers, and Ancestry.com has 10 million.” Kolata, supra note 66. 
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very utility of GEDmatch is based on its openness.68 When he later learned 
of the government use of GEDmatch, Curtis Rogers, a GEDmatch operator 
noted “it has always been GEDmatch’s policy to inform users that the 
database could be used for other uses, as set forth in the Site Policy.”69 
Rogers warned, “[W]hile the database was created for genealogical 
research, it is important that GEDmatch participants understand the 
possible uses of their DNA, including identification of relatives that have 
committed crimes or were victims of crimes.”70 According to Paul Holes, 
such openness offered law enforcement officials access to “a large pool of 
profiles and didn’t require a court order.”71 
After Holes’ prompting, Steve Rhods, an investigator with the 
Ventura County District Attorney’s Office, found a second rape kit in the 
county’s coroner’s office that proved to be “the mother lode of DNA.”72 
The upload to GEDmatch revealed a distant match that was “roughly the 
equivalent of third cousins.”73 Holes traced back these distant relatives to 
find a common ancestor.74 His search created a family lineage that “went 
back to ‘great-great-great-grandparents in the early 1800s’” that mostly 
identified persons “from the East Coast or Midwest.”75 The investigators 
slowly tracked their suspect through the generations by tracing “offspring 
to the present day.”76 Holes whittled down the “huge” family trees he had 
created on Ancestry.com by consulting “census data, old newspaper 
clippings,” gravesite locator, and LexisNexis.77 The task investigators 
faced was daunting; out of some 25 family trees, the one including 
DeAngelo contained about 1,000 members.78 
 
 68. Gafni, supra note 57. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ailsa Chang & Adhiti Bandlamudi, Tactics Used To Find Golden State Killer Raise 
Privacy and Legal Questions, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www. 
npr.org/2018/04/27/606580162/tactics-used-to-find-golden-state-killer-raise-privacy-and-
legal-questions. 
 72. Winton, supra note 60. The discovery of this DNA sample was due to the diligence 
of a “meticulous pathologist” who had put “a duplicate evidence kit” in a freezer in 1980. 
Jouvenal, supra note 2. “Many other DNA samples from the case had been depleted over 
the years.” Id. 
 73. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Winton, supra note 60. 
 76. Id.; Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 77. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
 78. Id. 
[FINAL-FOR-TOM]DERY_GENETICGENEALOGY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2019  10:05 AM 
114 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2 
Towards the end of the investigation, Holes had focused on five white 
men, including DeAngelo.79 Holes considered some of DeAngelo’s factors, 
such as his age and his “serving full-time as a cop,” as “strike(s) against” 
being the killer.80 One fact, however, was particularly damning for 
DeAngelo. During a July 1978 rape, the East Area Rapist “was sobbing 
and saying, ‘I hate you Bonnie, I hate you Bonnie.”81 Investigators learned 
that DeAngelo “had been engaged to a woman named Bonnie in 1970.”82 
In April 2018, police observed DeAngelo speeding his motorcycle down 
the freeway in excess of 100 miles an hour.83 Holes noted “stop signs are 
optional for this guy.”84 Detectives collected DeAngelo’s DNA from the 
door of his car while he shopped in a Hobby Lobby in Roseville, 
California.85 This DNA “matched semen recovered at the scene of some of 
the Golden State Killer’s crime scenes.”86 They later obtained a second 
sample “from a tissue in DeAngelo’s trash outside of his home.”87 Police 
arrested DeAngelo on April 24, 2018.88 The warrant police obtained to 
search DeAngelo’s home was based in part on the earlier genealogical 
search in this case.89 
The pursuit of the Golden State Killer through genealogical sites is not 
an isolated case. In June of 2018, Lancaster County District Attorney, 
Craig Stedman, announced at a news conference the arrest of Raymond 
Rowe for the beating, sexual assault, and strangulation of Christy Mirack.90 
Mirack was a 25-year-old schoolteacher whose murder case went cold 
despite the forensic testing of 60 suspects and the conducting of over 1,500 
 
 79. Ryan Lillis, Here’s the Inside Story of How Police Nabbed the East Area Rapist 
Suspect, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 29, 2018), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/ 
article210003114.html. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Paige St. John et al., DNA Lifted From Golden State Killer Suspect at Hobby Lobby 
Parking Lot Key to Cracking Case, Documents Show, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-golden-state-killer-deangelo-warrant-20180 
601-story.html. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Search Warrant, supra note 53, at 42. 
 90. Swenson, supra note 17. 
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interviews.91 Mirack’s mother made a “deathbed plea in the newspaper for 
new information” and her brother put up a billboard and started a Facebook 
page seeking tips.92 Recognizing that they “didn’t have any more arrows in 
the quiver,” authorities turned to genetic genealogy.93 The District 
Attorney’s Office worked with Parabon NanoLabs, which created “a 
genotype file” from semen found on the “carpeting under the victim’s body 
and on her person.”94 Parabon NanoLabs uploaded this file to GEDmatch, 
which enabled them to build family trees offering “highly scientific” 
suggestions for traditional police investigations.95 Pennsylvania State 
Police narrowed the search to Rowe, who was scheduled to perform as a 
DJ at an elementary school event.96 Undercover officers then collected 
chewing gum and a water bottle that Rowe had used and then discarded.97 
The crime lab linked Rowe to the Mirack homicide with a “1 in 200 
octillion chance the match is to another member of the Caucasian 
population who is not Rowe.”98 
Law enforcement also visited public genealogy sites to solve the 1988 
abduction, rape, and strangulation-murder of eight-year-old April Tinsley 
of Fort Wayne, Indiana.99 The case became Indiana’s “most notorious cold 
case” in part due to the alleged killer’s threats toward other little girls in 
Fort Wayne starting in 2004.100 The attacker left notes, found inside bags 
with used condoms or Polaroid pictures of his body, on the girls’ 
bicycles.101 One note chillingly read, “Hi honey I been watching you I am 
the same person that kidnapped an rape an kill Aproil Tinsley you are my 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. Investigators have also used forensic genealogy to identify victims of crime. 
Margaret Press and Colleen Fitzpatrick, co-founders of the DNA Doe Project, gave a name 
to a victim of a 37-year-old homicide case in four hours. Seth Augenstein, Buck Skin Girl 
Case Break Is Success of New DNA Doe Project, FORENSIC MAGAZINE (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2018/04/buck-skin-girl-case-break-success-new-dna-do 
e-project. In this case, which also relied on GEDmatch, Detective Steve Hickey of the 
Miami County Sheriff’s Department stated this development created “an active homicide 
investigation.” Id. 
 99. April Tinsley: DNA Snares Man in Indiana Girl’s 1988 Murder, supra note 17. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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next vitem (sic).”102 Authorities again turned to Parabon NanoLabs to 
analyze the DNA samples and then visited genealogy sites to gain a list of 
suspects.103 After narrowing their search to two brothers, police collected 
used condoms from the trash outside the trailer home of John D. Miller. 
Obtaining a match with the crime scene samples, officials contacted Miller 
and asked, “[W]hy he thought police were interested in speaking with 
him.”104 Police reported that Miller answered, “April Tinsley.”105 
The genetic genealogy investigations of DeAngelo, Rowe, and Miller 
are the advent of a potentially game-changing technology that represents 
hope for victims and families long suffering from seemingly unsolvable 
crimes. At the same time, this search technology is so uniquely powerful 
that it presents issues of crucial concern for Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
Implications of the Collection and Use of DNA Information 
from Genealogy Sites  
 
 Maryland v. King’s Ruling on Government DNA Collection Is 
So Narrow that it Provides Inadequate Guidance for 
Government Use of Genealogy Sites 
 
Should the Golden State Killer case reach the Court, one might 
suppose that the Court would consult its first case involving the Fourth 
Amendment implications of government use of DNA evidence in a 
criminal matter, Maryland v. King.106 Close scrutiny of King, however, 
might not support such an assumption. In King, the Court considered 
“whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection and analysis of a 
DNA sample from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony 
charges.”107 Officers arrested Alonzo King for assault by “menacing a 
group of people with a shotgun.”108 Police collected a DNA sample from 
King, as “part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses,” by 
rubbing a “filter paper or cotton swab” against the inside of his cheek.109 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. King, 569 U.S. at 442. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 439. 
 109. Id. at 440, 444. 
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King’s DNA matched a sample of DNA taken from a rape occurring six 
years earlier, resulting in his trial and conviction of rape.110 
The corrections officers at the booking facility in King automatically 
collected DNA in reliance on a Maryland statute authorizing “law 
enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from ‘an individual who is 
charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of 
violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.’”111 The 
collected sample was not to be added to a government database until after 
probable cause was found at the arraignment or the detainee provided 
consent.112 The statute specifically limited the use of DNA records to 
identification purposes only.113 Maryland’s law explicitly prohibited 
searching for “familial matches,” providing: “A person may not perform a 
search of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of 
an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a 
biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was 
acquired.”114 Government officials uploaded King’s DNA information to 
Maryland’s DNA database.115 The identification of King as a rapist was 
based in part on the “national project to standardize collection and storage 
of DNA profiles” known as the “Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS).”116 Created by Congress and supervised by the FBI, CODIS “has 
grown to include all 50 states and a number of federal agencies.”117 CODIS 
“collects DNA profiles provided by local laboratories taken from arrestees, 
convicted offenders, and forensic evidence found at crime scenes.”118 
The King Court concluded that routine collection and analysis of 
DNA upon booking was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because 
“[W]hen officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a 
serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in 
custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like 
fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure 
that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”119 King reached this 
 
 110. Id. at 440. 
 111. Id. at 441, 443. 
 112. Id. at 443. 
 113. Id. at 444. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 441. 
 116. Id. at 444. 
 117. Id. at 444–45. 
 118. Id. at 445. 
 119. Id. at 465–66. 
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result without relying on the Fourth Amendment’s traditional norms of the 
warrant requirement or individualized suspicion.120 Instead, the Court 
assessed the reasonableness of the DNA collection by balancing the 
interests of government and individual.121 To King, context was key; the 
particular circumstances in which officials assumed responsibility over 
persons taken into their custody both heightened government interests122 
and lessened individual privacy concerns.123 
When considering government concerns, King was acutely aware of 
the high stakes involved in taking a person into custody because “the law is 
in the act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical 
dominion.”124 Officials had practical reasons for knowing “who has been 
arrested and who is being tried.”125 Learning identity revealed criminal 
history, which is crucial information because persons “detained for minor 
offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.”126 
Proper identification could alert officials to “a record of violence or mental 
disorder,” and therefore disclose “the type of person” officers are 
detaining.”127 Corrections officers could thus ensure that an arrestee did 
“not create inordinate ‘risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee 
population, and for a new detainee.’”128 DNA identification also promoted 
the “substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are 
available for trials” because it alerted officials to persons likely to fail to 
appear in court due to outstanding pending cases.129 Further, knowing a 
detainee’s past was “essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to 
 
 120. Id. at 447. 
 121. The Court explained, “[W]e balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-
related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.” Id. at 448. King also noted, 
“This application of ‘traditional standards of reasonableness’ requires a court to weigh ‘the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’” Id. at 448. 
 122. Id. at 449–456. King concluded, “In the balance of reasonableness required by the 
Fourth Amendment, therefore, the Court must give great weight both to the significant 
government interest at stake in the identification of arrestees and to the unmatched potential 
of DNA identification to serve that interest.” Id. at 461. 
 123. Id. at 461-464. King ruled, “The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into 
police custody “necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.” Id. at 462. 
 124. Id. at 449–50. 
 125. Id. at 450. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 452. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 452–53. 
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the public,” a vital factor in assessing bail eligibility.130 Fixing identity also 
served “the interests of justice” because properly connecting an arrestee to 
a crime could exonerate someone “wrongfully imprisoned for the same 
offense.”131 
An individual arrestee’s interests suffered by comparison to the 
“substantial government interest” in the “unique effectiveness of DNA 
identification.”132 King viewed the intrusion of a DNA cheek swab as 
“minimal”133 and the processing of a DNA sample in CODIS as 
reasonable.134 While noting that genes, “the coding regions” of DNA, 
provide instructions for making the proteins in an individual’s body,135 
King dismissed the “noncoding” DNA, which the government used to 
make a DNA identification of a person, as “‘junk’ DNA”136 which did not 
reveal “information beyond identification.”137 
Further, the legitimacy of privacy expectations was dependent upon 
“the individual’s legal relationship with the State.”138 King’s expectations 
were necessarily “diminished” because he was “an individual taken into 
police custody.”139 As a person who “has been arrested on probable cause 
for a dangerous offense,” King’s “freedom from police scrutiny” was 
simply reduced.140 Indeed, situational factors were so central to the analysis 
that the Court explicitly distinguished King’s DNA collection from a 
 
 130. Id. at 453. 
 131. Id. at 455. 
 132. Id. at 461. 
 133. Id. King described a buccal swab DNA sample as a “gentle rub along the inside of 
the cheek” that “does not break the skin.” Id. at 463–64. The sample involved “virtually no 
risk, trauma, or pain.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 464. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 442-43. 
 137. Id. at 464. Unfortunately, this information was outdated when the Court made its 
ruling, for scientists already knew even before the King opinion that “[S]pecific DNA once 
dismissed as junk plays an important role in brain development and might be involved in 
several devastating neurological diseases.” Jeffrey Norris, Brain Development Is Guided by 
Junk DNA that Isn’t Really Junk, UCSF (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.ucsf. edu/news/ 
2013/04/105126/brain-development-guided-junk-dna-isn%E2%80%99t-really-junk. While 
the Norris article is dated April 15, 2013, the Court decided King on June 3, 2013. Any 
information of a genetic predisposition for a “devastating” neurological disease, in light 
of the possible consequences for such practical matters as insurance and employment, could 
rightly be seen as highly personal and sensitive. 
 138. King, 569 U.S. at 462. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 463. 
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search of “the average citizen.”141 King warned that changing context could 
result in a different ruling; the Court noted, “If in the future police analyze 
samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a 
particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that 
case would present additional privacy concerns not present here.”142 The 
Court thus concluded, “In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by 
probable cause respondent’s expectations of privacy were not offended” by 
the DNA collection in this case.143 
As the Court’s only case directly dealing with a Fourth Amendment 
search of a person’s DNA, King must be accounted for when considering 
police use of genetic genealogy. King deemed reasonable the mandatory 
collection of DNA from arrestees of violent offenses about to be taken into 
official custody.144 The utility of this holding in assessing government 
collection of DNA information from genealogical sites, however, might be 
quite limited. The context of King, so important to the Court, significantly 
differed from that of genetic genealogy. In King, officers had probable 
cause that the person searched had committed a crime.145  The government 
therefore had the “uncontested” right, “always recognized under English 
and American law,” to search the lawfully arrested person.146 Further, King 
was jailed and therefore exposed to booking procedures having “different 
constitutional justifications” than searches in other places.147 King’s jail 
context was crucial because State interests “are further different” when the 
government takes on the grave responsibility of “subjecting the body of the 
accused to its physical dominion.”148 In this setting, DNA identification 
was critical for a host of government interests, including safety of staff, 
fellow prisoners, and the arrestee himself,149 determination of availability 
for trial, potential danger to the public,150 and the interests of justice.151 In 
contrast, the government visits to genealogy sites in pursuit of DeAngelo, 
Rowe, and Miller lacked all the contextual justifications bolstering King’s 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 464–65. 
 143. Id. at 465. 
 144. Id. at 465–66. 
 145. Id. at 449 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 449-50. 
 149. Id. at 452. 
 150. Id. at 452-53. 
 151. Id. at 453. 
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collection of DNA. To say that police lacked probable cause pinpointing 
these suspects is an enormous understatement; law enforcement did not 
even have these individuals on its radar. As for jail, these cases had become 
so cold that, before GEDmatch, subjecting the bodies of these suspects to 
the government’s physical dominion was a practical impossibility. 
King’s contextual limit similarly suffers when comparing King’s 
individual interests with those of the genetic genealogy suspects. King, due 
to his “legal relationship with the state” as an arrestee entering custody, had 
“diminished” privacy expectations.152 DeAngelo, Rowe, and Miller, having 
no such custodial relationship with the State when law enforcement visited 
the genealogy sites, suffered no corresponding diminution of privacy 
expectations. Instead, they were the very “average citizen(s)” King 
distinguished from jail inmates.153 Finally, King explicitly noted its case 
did not involve “familial” matching,” the central strategy involved in the 
genetic genealogy cases.154 Thus, while King offers a detailed picture of the 
Court’s analysis of Fourth Amendment privacy issues involving DNA, the 
narrowness of its ruling undermines its usefulness in providing guidance 
for government exploration of genealogical sites. 
 
 Carpenter v. United States’ Recent Limit on the Third Party 
Doctrine, Which Held that Persons Undermine Their Privacy 
Expectations by Sharing Information, Could Dramatically 
Constrain Government Downloads from Genealogical Sites 
 
When one uploads his or her genetic information onto a genealogical 
site, he or she shares it with third parties. The whole point of exposing this 
information to the public on the website is to enable someone else to access 
the information about one’s DNA in hopes of identifying lost or unknown 
relatives. In revealing genetic information when searching for one’s family, 
is a person giving up his or her right to privacy from a government search 
of this information? The Court’s third party doctrine could directly affect 
the Fourth Amendment rights of those who upload their DNA.155 
Katz rejected the notion that a Fourth Amendment “search” requires a 
physical trespass upon a constitutionally protected area, explaining that 
what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
 
 152. Id. at 462. 
 153. Id. at 463. 
 154. Id. at 441. 
 155. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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the public, may be constitutionally protected.156 By the same token, 
however, the Court declared, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”157 Katz’s “knowingly exposes” language 
ultimately took on great significance in creating the third party doctrine 
where “an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”158 
For decades, the Court ruled that sharing information with another 
person often amounted to losing any Fourth Amendment privacy protection 
in the information disclosed. In United States v. Dionisio, where a grand 
jury subpoenaed an illegal gambling suspect to provide a voice exemplar 
for comparison with FBI recordings, the Court found that the government 
demand involved no intrusion on a reasonable expectation of privacy.159 
Because “nothing is being exposed to the grand jury that has not previously 
been exposed to the public at large,” Dionisio could not have “a reasonable 
expectation that others” would not know the sound of his voice “any more 
than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the 
world.”160 
Information sharing with a “third party” squandered Fourth 
Amendment privacy in United States v. Miller.161 In Miller, the government 
sought a bank depositor’s “checks and other bank records” in its 
investigation of the depositor’s unregistered still and whiskey business.162 
When Miller objected that his bank documents had been illegally seized, 
the Court found no intrusion of a Fourth Amendment interest.163 Miller 
noted that the depositor, “in revealing his affairs to another,” took the risk 
that the information so revealed would “be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”164 The Court therefore ruled, “the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose 
 
 156. Id. at 351. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417. 
 159. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1973). 
 160. Id. at 14. 
 161. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976). 
 162. Id. at 436. 
 163. Id. at 438, 440. 
 164. Id. at 443. 
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and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”165 
Sharing information, even as sensitive as personal finances and even with 
an institution as discrete as a bank, led to exposure of that information to 
the government without Fourth Amendment protection. 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court determined that what was true about 
sharing one’s voice and banking records was also true about sharing 
numbers dialed from a phone.166 In Smith, police used a pen register to 
collect the numbers a robber dialed from his phone in making threatening 
calls to a robbery victim.167 When Smith sought to suppress the dialed 
numbers, the Court refused to do so, noting that he “voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that 
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business”168 Smith 
declared once again that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”169 
The Court, in California v. Greenwood, even applied its third party 
doctrine to persons who roll their trash to the curb for collection.170 
Greenwood found no Fourth Amendment search occurred when police 
rummaged through garbage for narcotics evidence because the residents 
“exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”171 Placing trash on the curb made it 
“readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, (and) snoops.”172 
The whole point of leaving refuse at the curb was “for the express purpose 
of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have 
sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to 
do so.”173 Therefore, there was “no reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
the discarded items.174 
The Court’s latest pronouncement on the third party doctrine, in its 
2018 case, Carpenter v. United States, was more nuanced than previous 
declarations. In Carpenter, police officers and FBI agents suspected 
Timothy Carpenter of being involved in robberies of nine stores in 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 167. Id. at 742. 
 168. Id. at 737, 744. 
 169. Id. at 743–44. 
 170. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 171. Id. at 37–38, 40. 
 172. Id. at 40. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 41. 
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Michigan and Ohio.175 Federal prosecutors therefore sought court orders 
“under the Stored Communications Act” to obtain Carpenter’s cell phone 
records.176 Federal magistrate judges ordered MetroPCS and Sprint to 
provide cell site information for Carpenter’s phone over the four months 
during which the robberies were committed.177 Pursuant to the orders, 
agents collected “cell-site location information (CSLI)” over 127 days from 
MetroPCS alone.178 CSLI is the information wireless carriers collect from 
cell phones in order to “continuously scan their environment looking for 
the best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site.”179 
Smartphones tap into the wireless network “several times a minute” even 
when the owner is not using the phone.180 The resulting “time-stamped” 
records, which companies store for their own business purposes, are the 
CSLI.181 CSLI gives authorities a precise map of where a phone, and 
therefore the phone’s owner, has been. The collection of Carpenter’s CSLI 
provided officials with “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s 
movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”182 When the 
government used the CSLI to place Carpenter near four of the robberies, 
Carpenter objected that the use of these data constituted an unreasonable 
search made in absence of a warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement.183 
In considering Carpenter’s claim, the Court acknowledged that 
it had previously held, “a person has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”184 
The government, therefore, was “typically free to obtain” the shared 
information “from the recipient without triggering Fourth Amendment 
protections.”185 Carpenter, however, asserted that the third party doctrine 
had been limited from the start. The Court noted that, in Miller, the case 
 
 175. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2212 (2018). 
 176. Id. The level of suspicion needed to support the court orders was “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe.” Id. Such reasonable 
suspicion falls short of the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause for a warrant. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 2211. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 2211, 2212. 
 182. Id. at 2212. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 2216. 
 185. Id. 
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where the third party doctrine traced its “roots,” the information lacking 
Fourth Amendment protection had: 1) a particular “nature,” and 2) a 
specific relationship with the person claiming privacy.186 The nature of 
Miller’s documents “confirmed Miller’s limited expectation of privacy” 
because they were “not confidential communications but negotiable 
documents,” such as checks “exposed” to employees “in the ordinary 
course of business.”187 As for Miller’s relationship with the documents, it 
was quite weak because he could “assert neither ownership nor possession” 
of the papers.188 Carpenter then declared that Smith, the third party case 
occurring only three years after Miller, was a similarly narrow case.189 
Smith involved pen registers—devices that merely recorded numbers 
dialed from a phone—a technology with “limited capabilities.”190 Together, 
Miller and Smith “did not rely solely on the act of sharing” but instead 
took into account the “nature” of the information sought and the “limited 
capabilities” of the government technology used to collect the 
information.191 
Carpenter then distinguished Miller and Smith from the facts in its 
own case. The nature of the information collected in Carpenter represented 
a “world of difference” from that obtained in Miller and Smith.192 The 
CSLI presented “an all-encompassing record” of the “privacies of life,” 
including aspects of “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”193 Unlike prior methodologies, cell phone location had a 
“retrospective quality” enabling the government to “travel back in time” to 
reconstruct a person’s movements “every moment of every day for five 
years.”194 Further, unlike the information in earlier third-party precedent, 
CSLI information had a particularly intimate relationship with the phone 
user because a cell phone has become “almost a ‘feature of human 
anatomy’” that can reveal visits to “doctor’s offices, political headquarters, 
and other potentially revealing locales.”195 Finally, the capabilities of CSLI 
represented a “seismic shift” in technology from Miller and Smith because 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 2219. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 2217. 
 194. Id. at 2218. 
 195. Id. 
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the “exhaustive chronicle of location information” can be “casually 
collected” with a “click of a button.”196 
DNA, in 1) the nature of the information it contains, 2) the 
relationship of that information with the individuals claiming Fourth 
Amendment protection and 3) the capability of the technology exploiting it, 
shares similarities with the CSLI in Carpenter. Analysis of these three 
factors indicates that the Court would refuse to extend its third-party 
doctrine to warrantless government collection of DNA information from 
genealogical sites. Trouble starts for officials using genetic genealogy with 
the first factor regarding the “nature” of the information collected. It is hard 
to overstate the intimacy of DNA information, housed in the “nucleus of all 
human cells,” which offers a blueprint to the entire body.197 DNA provides 
a “treasure trove” of private data, including details on “family, lineage and 
ethnicity” and even a window into potential disease.198 The very sensitivity 
of DNA information forces commercial sites such as 23andMe to “work 
very hard to protect their customers’ privacy.”199 While Carpenter’s CSLI 
could reveal a visit to the doctor’s office, DNA could expose the 
underlying health issue itself.200 
Carpenter’s focus on the relationship of information to the individual 
also favors Fourth Amendment protection of genealogical information. If a 
cellphone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy,’” DNA is quite literally 
a feature of human anatomy.201 DNA is “deeply revealing” precisely 
because it intimately maps a person’s behavior and, in part, fate.202 Without 
discounting the importance of environment, DNA has been linked to such 
deeply sensitive personal traits as promiscuity, learning ability, and violent 
criminality.203 The information on genealogy sites would therefore 
 
 196. Id. at 2219. 
 197. King, 569 U.S. at 442. 
 198. Jouvenal et al., supra note 62. 
 199. Shapiro, supra note 64. 
 200. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 2223. 
 203. Susan Donaldson James, Thrill-Seeking Gene Can Lead to More Sex Partners, 
ABC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/scientists-discover-gene-resp 
onsible-cheating-promiscuous-sex-habits/story?id=12322891 (“[A]bout half of all people 
have a gene that makes them more vulnerable to promiscuity and cheating.”). Julia Rosen, 
About Half of Kids’ Learning Ability Is in Their DNA, Study Says, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-math-reading-genes-201407 
11-stor y.html (“[A]pproximately half of False children’s math and reading ability stemmed 
from their genetic makeup.”). Melissa Hogenboom, Two Genes Linked with Violent Crime, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-enviro nment-29760212 
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represent a “world of difference” from Miller and Smith, thus 
distinguishing this precedent into insignificance.204 
Finally, Carpenter’s discussion regarding the capabilities of the 
government technology being used militates against allowing visits to 
genealogical sites without a warrant. Carpenter forbade warrantless use of 
cell phone data because of the “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” 
of CSLI technology.205 The daunting scope of CSLI searches was 
presumably due to its ability to penetrate fully into the many aspects of its 
target’s lives by learning a person’s every location in collecting no less 
than 101 data points a day.206 In comparison, the DNA making up 
genealogical information penetrates at a deeper level, revealing such 
secrets as susceptibility to certain diseases, such as breast cancer, 
Huntington’s disease, and cystic fibrosis.207 Moreover, DNA can reveal a 
person’s potential longevity, risk of obesity, his or her body clock (whether 
an early riser or a night owl), and possession of “sensation-seeking and 
impulsive tendencies.”208 Therefore, the Court that was offended by the 
prospect of the government tracking individuals by every nearby cell site 
would likely be appalled by official intrusion into DNA. 
Further, Carpenter worried about the “inescapable and automatic 
nature” of CSLI collection.209 Anyone who uses a smartphone—a 
technology so necessary today that people “compulsively carry cellphones 
with them all the time”—is exposed to information collection even when 
the phone is not in use.210 DNA housed on genealogy sites shares the 
involuntary character of CSLI exposure. No one could stop a government 
official from looking at the DNA one shares with a relative. Once an 
individual uploads his or her DNA, any distant cousin or granddaughter 
sharing this DNA is helpless to opt out. More fundamentally, one does not 
choose his or her DNA at birth and, so far, has no ability to change it 
 
(“A genetic analysis of almost 900 offenders in Finland has revealed two genes associated 
with violent crime.”). 
 204. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 205. Id. at 2223. 
 206. Id. at 2212. 
 207. James Randerson, What DNA Can Tell Us: Genes Alone Cannot Account for What 
a Person Is, But Even the Slightest Distinguishing Traits Between People Can be Attributed 
to Individual Genes, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
science/2008/apr/27/genetics.cancer. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 210. Id. at 2218. 
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thereafter. The DNA, automatically self-replicating in each cell, generates 
by a process beyond human will. 
Carpenter also feared the time-machine character of CSLI technology, 
noting that a search of cell site data enabled officials to “travel back in time 
to retrace a person’s whereabouts.211 To perform such tracking, police 
“need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular 
individual, or when.”212 When it comes to investigating the intricate details 
of a person’s past, DNA is even more Orwellian than CSLI. While CSLI 
can allow the government to review “five years,” genealogical genetics 
enables officialdom to explore untold generations.213  
In the past, the Court has recognized the potential for “highly 
sophisticated” technology to corrode privacy.214 Indeed, the Court has 
explicitly noted, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected 
by the advance of technology.”215 Carpenter’s concerns, therefore, are not 
unjustified. If the Court found CSLI collection to be “qualitatively 
different” from earlier cases allowing government access to shared 
information, the prospect of official use of the even more intrusive 
technology—genetic genealogy—will likely raise the Court’s ire.216 When 
confronted with government exploitation of genealogy sites, therefore, the 
Court will probably follow Carpenter in ensuring that the “‘progress of 
science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”217 
 
 The Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Consent Precedent Will 
Likely Not Support Government Exploration of Genealogical 
Sites for Genetic Information 
 
When a person uploads his or her DNA information to a genealogy 
site, this individual is giving consent for others to access this information. 
 
 211. Id. at 2210. 
 212. Id. at 2218. 
 213. Id.; Jouvenal, supra note 2. Further, certain language in Carpenter indicated that 
the Court might find the very purpose for which the government visited a genealogical site 
to be concerning. In downplaying the intrusiveness of Smith’s pen registers, Carpenter 
noted that such “telephone call logs reveal little in the way of ‘identifying information.’” Id. 
at 19. The entire purpose of examining genealogical data in the Golden State Killer case was 
to identify the Golden State Killer suspect—to name an individual as perpetrator. 
 214. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
 215. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
 216. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 217. Id. at 2223. 
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Since the genetic information the person is providing is partly shared by 
others, the upload could be seen as an example of third-party consent, 
where one person gives permission to intrude on an area or thing 
commonly possessed with another. The Court explored the Fourth 
Amendment implications of third-party consent in United States v. 
Matlock.218 In Matlock, police officers arrested William Matlock for 
robbery in the front yard of his residence.219 After placing Matlock in a 
squad car,220 the officers went to the house and met Mrs. Gayle Graff, 
“who was dressed in a robe and was holding her son in her arms.”221 Mrs. 
Graff permitted police to search for money and a gun in the bedroom of a 
home that she jointly occupied with Matlock.222 As a result of the 
consensual search of the bedroom, officers found $4,995.00 in cash inside 
a diaper bag.223 
Since Matlock himself did not consent to the search, the issue before 
the Court was “whether Mrs. Graff’s relationship to the east bedroom was 
sufficient to make her consent to the search valid against . . . Matlock.”224 
The Court ruled, “the consent of one who possesses common authority 
over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting 
person with whom that authority is shared.”225 A person’s “common 
authority” to give consent is not based on “mere property interest.”226 This 
power instead rests “on mutual use of the property by persons generally 
having joint access or control for most purposes.”227 The sharing of access 
or control makes it “reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants 
has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others 
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common 
area to be searched.”228 In sharing a place with another person, one 
automatically assumes that other person might expose that “common area” 
 
 218. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). 
 219. Id. at 166. 
 220. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. at 166. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 166–67. 
 224. Id. at 167. 
 225. Id. at 170. 
 226. Id. at 171, n. 7. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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to others, even the police. Thus, Matlock, in sharing a bedroom with Mrs. 
Graff, took the risk that she might allow officers to enter and search it.229 
Matlock, tucked away in a patrol car before police approached his 
home, never had the opportunity to object to a search of his bedroom.230 
Scott Randolph, in Georgia v. Randolph, was under no similar restraint.231 
In Randolph, Scott Randolph was present and arguing with his estranged 
wife, Janet Randolph, when she “readily gave” consent to search for 
Scott’s “items of drug evidence” in their house.232 Relying on Janet’s 
consent, the officer recovered cocaine from the Randolph’s bedroom.233 
The issue presented to the Court was whether a search based on third party 
consent is lawful “with the permission of one occupant when the other, 
who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and 
expressly refuses to consent.”234 Randolph held, “a physically present co-
occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless 
search unreasonable and invalid as to him.”235 
Randolph based its ruling on “widely shared social expectations.”236 
Society’s understanding about who possesses the authority to consent to a 
particular search, while influenced by property law, is “not controlled by its 
rules.”237 Instead, social expectations about consent are “a function of 
commonly held understandings about the authority that co-inhabitants may 
exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.”238 Randolph elucidated 
its “commonly held understanding” concept through a series of examples. 
The Court first presented the societal expectations of Matlock: 
 
When someone comes to the door of a domestic dwelling 
with a baby at her hip, as Mrs. Graff did, she shows that she 
belongs there, and that fact standing alone is enough to tell a law 
enforcement officer or any other visitor that if she occupies the 
place along with others, she probably lives there subject to the 
assumption tenants usually make about their common authority 
 
 229. Id. at 175–76. 
 230. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 231. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 232. Id. at 107. 
 233. Specifically, the officer found “a section of a drinking straw with a powdery 
residue he suspected was cocaine.” Id. 
 234. Id. at 106. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 111. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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when they share quarters. They understand that any one of them 
may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious 
to one may nevertheless be admitted in his absence by another.239 
 
Matlock, in choosing to live in such an arrangement, assumed a risk 
that his cohabitant would invite others inside the home in his absence, an 
arrangement so typical that officers rightly could rely upon it without 
making inquiries into the possibility of some “eccentric scheme” to the 
contrary.240 In contrast, Randolph noted that “no common authority could 
sensibly be suspected” for a landlord offering admission into an apartment 
without first seeking permission from the tenant or a hotel manager 
allowing entry into a room without asking for approval from the current 
hotel guest.241 Moreover, an eight-year-old child, who could invite a 
“pollster or salesman” across the threshold of a home, could not allow 
rummaging “through his parents’ bedroom.”242 Finally, a homeowner’s 
authority to admit someone “over the objection of” his or her houseguest 
was limited because of the “customary expectation of courtesy or 
deference” shown a houseguest.243 Randolph concluded, “there is no 
common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority 
to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color 
of the curtains or invitations to outsiders.”244 
The Court again considered a “disputed invitation”245 in Fernandez v. 
California, a case in which Fernandez objected to an officer’s entry by 
announcing, “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my 
rights.”246 Having probable cause that Fernandez had assaulted his 
domestic partner, police arrested him and took him to the station.247 An 
officer then returned to Fernandez’s residence, successfully gaining 
permission to search from his domestic partner, Rojas.248 The resulting 
search recovered evidence linking Fernandez to a robbery.249 While noting 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 111–12. 
 241. Id. at 112 (further explaining that “a hotel guest customarily has no reason to 
expect the manager to allow anyone but his own employees into his room”). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 113. 
 244. Id. at 114. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303-304 (2014). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 1131. 
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that a caller would have “no confidence” in one occupant’s invitation if a 
co-occupant was present and objecting, Fernandez believed that the 
calculus “would be quite different” if “the objecting tenant was not 
standing at the door.”250 With the objecting occupant absent, “the friend or 
visitor is much more likely to accept the invitation to enter.”251 Fernandez 
thus adhered to the social norms analysis developed in Randolph. 
If the Court applied only Matlock’s “assumption of risk” test, it would 
provide inadequate answers for those whose relatives have uploaded DNA 
onto genealogical websites.252 When a person shares his or her genetic 
information with an open source site, such as GEDmatch, this individual 
makes a privacy decision for his or her whole family.253 The GEDmatch 
user forfeits “the genetic privacy of an entire family for generations,”254 
destroying the privacy both of relatives unknown and unborn. Matlock’s 
reliance on “mutual use” would fail family members because even though 
two distant relatives may both possess certain segments of information in 
their chromosomes, such “mutual use” would fail to establish the “common 
authority” envisioned by the Court.255 Rather than making a conscious 
choice to share a particular piece of property, relatives having the same 
portion of DNA instead share information—without any volitional 
decision. Also, unlike Matlock’s shared bedroom, mutual use does not 
provide “joint control,” as each relative “uses” his or her genome 
separately and automatically, through biological processes, without input 
from any other family member.256 This lack of interaction among mutual 
users denies any opportunity to negotiate the terms of privacy. Since the 
transmission of DNA by birth is a wholly programmed process, common 
possessors of DNA could not be said to have “assumed the risk” that, in the 
involuntary “act” of sharing genes with family, any particular member has 
 
 250. Id. at 1135. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n. 7. 
 253. New York University Law Professor Erin Murphy explained, “If I’m making a 
decision that affects my brother, my sister, my father, my children, essentially everybody 
I’m related to, I think that’s really different.” Megan Jula, The Breakthrough DNA 
Technique that Led Cops to the Golden State Killer Suspect Is Exciting—and Terrifying, 
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/04/the-
breakthrough-dna-technique-that-led-cops-to-the-golden-state-killer-suspect-is-exciting-an 
d-terrifying/. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170. 
 256. Id. at 171, n. 7. 
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consciously chosen to allow another to expose shared information.257 Since 
Matlock’s underlying assumptions do not apply in the genetic genealogy 
context, its reasoning lacks convincing force, and therefore the case offers 
little guidance to the Court regarding government visits to genealogical 
sites. 
In the face of Matlock’s inadequacy in assessing genetic genealogy, 
the Court could turn to Randolph and Fernandez. However, as currently 
applied, Randolph’s and Fernandez’s objecting occupant would not clarify 
genealogical privacy issues. Considering “widely shared social 
expectations,” Randolph bridled at the thought of overriding a physically 
present co-occupant’s refusal to allow entry.258 In contrast, Fernandez 
considered the situation “quite different” when an objecting tenant failed to 
be “standing at the door.”259 Since each of us has an untold number of 
relatives who could access genealogical sites at any time and any place on 
the globe, we cannot be ever-present at each computer a relative is using to 
access the Internet. All of us would inevitably be an absent occupant in 
most places and at most times. Under Fernandez, our absence at each 
genealogical site “door” upon which the government knocked when 
exploring DNA would deny us a right to privacy. Given the lack of an 
actual objection, the Court would simply return to the absent—and silent—
cohabitant originally considered in Matlock. 
To adequately address third party consent in the genetic genealogy 
context, the Court would need to refine Randolph’s “widely shared social 
expectations” test for Matlock’s absent and un-objecting mutual user 
context.260 While Randolph did apply its societal expectations test to 
Matlock’s facts, it concluded that an occupant could admit an “obnoxious” 
visitor in the cohabitant’s absence.261 Given the inability of an individual to 
be at every door the government might open by visiting a genealogy site, 
Randolph’s willingness to admit every obnoxious visitor might be strained 
to the breaking point. 
A flat rejection of Randolph’s conclusion, however, would not alone 
identify the “widely shared social expectations” about genealogy sites.262 
There is a difficulty in analyzing social expectations in this context, due to 
the recent advent of genealogy sites. GEDmatch began operations as late as 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106, 111. 
 259. Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 303. 
 260. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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2010.263 Such newness has not allowed for a full societal consensus to 
emerge. In contrast, the rights of the homeowner have been understood 
with relative certainty since 1603, when articulated in Semayne’s Case.264 
Further, a “consensus” has not even been formed in individual minds, if 
one considers the inconsistent behavior of persons using the Internet. Often 
people will blithely give up privacy by clicking “agree” to myriad privacy 
policies they have chosen not to read. When privacy invasions make the 
news, however, these same persons can be brought up short by the 
intrusiveness of an incursion. Peter Neufeld of The Innocence Project has 
noted, “There is a whole generation that says, ‘I don’t really care about 
privacy,” until “there is a Cambridge Analytica.”265 Neufeld continued, 
“No one has thought about what are the possible consequences.”266 This 
same dynamic could play out with genealogy sites. Focused on the 
immediate goal of tracking down a lost relative, persons might not see the 
long view which, had they pondered it, could appall them. 
If, with the passage of time, persons did pause to consider the privacy 
concerns of genetic genealogy, most would likely not expect that their 
relatives, however distant or unknown, could permit entry into something 
as “deeply revealing” as DNA.267 It is one thing to enable another person to 
allow exploration of the privacy of a shared home. It is quite another to 
permit investigation into the privacy of shared genes. Although the issue 
has not had time to fully cohere, “widely shared social expectations” will 
likely forbid one person giving the government permission to use shared 





 263. Cyrus Farivar, GEDmatch, a Tiny DNA Analysis Firm, Was Key for Golden State 
Killer Case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/ 
04/gedmatch-a-tiny-dna-analysis-firm-was-key-for-golden-state-killer-case/ (“In fact, when 
it first began in 2010, GEDmatch did not even require a login.”). 
 264. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). 
 265. Kolata, supra note 66; see generally Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge 
Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained. 
html. (“Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm hired by President Trump’s 2016 election 
campaign, gained access to private information on more than 50 million Facebook users. 
The firm offered tools that could identify the personalities of American voters and influence 
their behavior.”) 
 266. Kolata, supra note 66. 
 267. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
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 If the Court Characterizes Law Enforcement’s Use of 
Genealogical Sites as a Government Search that Occurred 
after a Private Intrusion, the Lawfulness of the Official Search 
Will Be Assessed in Reference to the Scope of the Earlier 
Private Search 
 
Suppose your neighbor, hoping to borrow a cup of sugar, enters the 
cupboard of your unlocked home without permission while you are away. 
Suppose further that your neighbor, looking in your bag of sugar, finds 
powder cocaine, of which he promptly tells the police. Nothing stops law 
enforcement from taking and using that knowledge about the cocaine’s 
existence. Once a secret is out in the open, it can no longer be a secret; any 
privacy interest in that bit of information is dead. 
Therefore, the Court has determined that an invasion of privacy by an 
individual citizen can have Fourth Amendment consequences on a later 
government search. In Walter v. United States, packages containing 871 
boxes of sexually explicit 8-millimeter films were delivered to the wrong 
address, the hosiery company, L’Eggs Products, Inc.268 When employees at 
the company opened the packages, they found on the boxes within 
“suggestive drawings” and “explicit descriptions of the contents.”269 They 
alerted the FBI to their find, causing agents to pick up the films and view 
them with a projector.270 As a result, the federal government charged the 
defendant with interstate transportation of obscene films.271 The Walter 
Court thus confronted the issue of “whether the Fourth Amendment 
required the agents to obtain a warrant before they screened the films.”272 
In considering the case, Walter noted that no Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred when the L’Eggs employees themselves opened the 
packages because “a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private 
party does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”273 Further, the “private 
wrongdoing” did not “deprive the government of the right to use evidence 
 
 268. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980); see also United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (“While there was no single opinion of the Court [in 
Walter], a majority did agree on the appropriate analysis of a governmental search which 
follows on the heels of a private one.”). 
 269. Id. at 651–52. 
 270. Id. at 652. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 651. 
 273. Id. at 656. 
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that it ha(d) acquired lawfully.”274 Walter measured the reasonableness of 
the government intrusion by reference to the earlier private invasion, noting 
that nothing was wrongful about the government’s examination of the 
packages’ contents “to the extent that they had already been examined by 
third parties.”275 Noting the evils of the “indiscriminate searches” 
performed under general warrants, Walter declared that any authorized 
search was “limited by the particular terms of its authorization.”276 In like 
manner, a private party’s “invasion of another person’s privacy” limited a 
later official search.277 While the government could reexamine the 
materials previously viewed by private persons, it could not “exceed the 
scope” of the prior private search without independent justification.278 
Essentially, “the legality of the governmental search” had to be “tested by 
the scope of the antecedent private search.”279 
In Walter, the private search was limited, involving only the opening 
of the package to reveal the explicit drawings and pictures on the boxes 
inside, while the FBI’s intrusion was more invasive, including the watching 
of the actual films.280 Therefore, the earlier private search only frustrated 
the defendant’s reasonable privacy expectations “in part;” it “did not 
simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all 
Fourth Amendment protection.”281 Ultimately, Walter ruled that since “the 
additional search conducted by the FBI—the screening of the films—was 
not supported by any justification,” it violated the Fourth Amendment.282 
Package problems were the focus of the Court’s next private party 
search case, United States. v. Jacobsen.283 In Jacobsen, Federal Express 
employees, pursuant to company policy regarding insurance claims, 
examined “an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper” that was 
“torn by a forklift.”284 Inside the box, employees found a 10-inch long 
duct-tape tube, which they opened, finding plastic bags of white powder.285 
 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 657. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 116 (1984). 
 280. Walter, 447 U.S. at 651–52. 
 281. Id. at 659. 
 282. Id. 
 283. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 284. Id. at 111. 
 285. Id. 
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Replacing the bags in the tube and the tube into the box, the employees 
then alerted the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).286 Upon arrival 
the DEA agent: 
 
saw that one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed 
the four plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He 
then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of 
the white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the 
spot identified the substance as cocaine.287 
 
The Court in Jacobsen adopted the reasoning it applied in Walter. 
Jacobsen, noting that Federal Express employees cut the tube and exposed 
the white powder, declared, “Whether those invasions were accidental or 
deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character.”288 The 
DEA’s “additional invasions” had to be “tested by the degree to which they 
exceeded the scope of the private search.”289 If the DEA did not move 
beyond the private invasion, then there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation.290 Since the defendant could not complain about a frustration of 
privacy expectations by a private party, the government was welcome to 
use the “now-nonprivate information.”291 If instead the DEA intruded 
beyond Federal Express’s initial invasion, then the Fourth Amendment was 
triggered “with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already 
been frustrated.”292 
Jacobsen then specified two distinct intrusions the DEA committed: 
1) the DEA agents “removed the tube from the box, the plastic bags from 
the tube and a trace of powder from the innermost bag,” and 2) they “made 
a chemical test of the powder.”293 The DEA’s first intrusion involving 
opening the package and picking up the tube gave the government no 
information it had not learned from the Federal Express employees.294 The 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 111–12. 
 288. Id. at 115. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 117. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. Jacobsen noted, “In such a case the authorities have not relied on what is in 
effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment if they 
act without a warrant.” Id. at 117–18. 
 293. Id. at 118. 
 294. Id. at 118–119. 
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defendants “could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package, 
since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had 
just examined the package and had, of their own accord, invited the federal 
agent to their offices for the express purpose of viewing its contents.”295 
Likewise, the DEA’s removal of the bags from the tube and visually 
inspecting them “enabled the agent to learn nothing that had not previously 
been learned during the private search.”296 
The Court also analyzed the DEA’s second intrusion “occasioned by 
the field test, which had not been conducted by the Federal Express agents 
and therefore exceeded the scope of the private search.”297 Since a Fourth 
Amendment search required government intrusion on a privacy expectation 
that was “reasonable”—or “legitimate”—Jacobsen viewed the field test 
intrusion through the prism of what interests could be considered 
“legitimate.”298 Society need not recognize as “legitimate” information 
regarding “wrongful” behavior, such as burglar’s presence in an empty 
cabin.299 The DEA’s “chemical test,” which merely disclosed the existence 
of cocaine—a substance illegal to possess—did not implicate “any 
legitimate interest in privacy.”300 
Thus, Walter and Jacobsen’s key point was that the amount of Fourth 
Amendment protection from a government intrusion depended on the scope 
of any earlier private invasion. Walter only found fault when the FBI went 
beyond the prior private search—opening the package and viewing the 
explicit drawings and pictures on the boxes within them—by actually 
watching the films.301 In short, the test was framed by the extent of the “the 
antecedent private search.”302 This analysis could open a path to admission 
for evidence from genetic genealogical sites. When a person, on his or her 
own initiative, provides a saliva sample to a commercial site, such as 
23andMe, and then uploads the results to an open genealogical site, such as 
GEDmatch, the individual is essentially exposing the portions of his or her 
DNA shared with relatives. Much as Walter’s L’Eggs employees opened 
the package or Jacobsen’s Federal Express employees cut the tube, the 
individual family member uploading his genetic information tears open 
 
 295. Id. at 119. 
 296. Id. at 119–120. 
 297. Id. at 122. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 123. 
 301. Walter, 447 U.S. at 651–52, 658. 
 302. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116. 
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segments of the DNA of all of his or her relatives to public view. When 
investigators later obtain this genetic information from GEDmatch, this 
initial collection itself goes no further than the original “antecedent private 
search.”303 
The only question remaining is whether government use of the DNA 
information in forming family trees and in comparing genes with crime 
scene samples amounts to a further official intrusion akin to the FBI 
watching the film from the opened box in Walter.304 The investigation 
techniques used to locate the Golden State Killer suspect after visiting 
GEDmatch do not seem likely to be considered further intrusions on par 
with viewing the film in Walter. Hole’s subsequent investigation in pursuit 
of DeAngelo involved only old-fashioned gumshoe detective work into 
public information. Reviews of census records, gravesite locators, and old 
newspaper obituaries involve only the examination of information 
available to anyone wishing to view it.305 The “antecedent private search” 
precedent could thus provide law enforcement with a door through which it 
might get genetic genealogy evidence admitted despite the lack of a 
warrant. 
Any person challenging evidence from a relative that the government 
has obtained from a genealogical site will have to establish “standing,” or 
the personal right to challenge the particular Fourth Amendment violation. 
Suppose the government acknowledged that its search for the Golden 
State Killer suspect’s distant relative on a genealogical site violated the 
Fourth Amendment. Would such concession help the suspect exclude the 
results of this genealogical search from court? It could be argued that the 
person who could claim invasion of privacy from the genealogical visit is 
not the suspect but the relative who’s DNA was the subject of state 
scrutiny. Any link to the suspect came only from DNA the suspect left—or 
essentially abandoned—at the crime scene as semen, blood, or other 
biological material. As previously noted, the later tracing from a distant 
relative’s common ancestor—the great, great, great, grandparent—
involved306 traditional types of investigation, such as looking at gravesites 
 
 303. Id. 
 304. The DEA’s field test of the powder in Jacobsen, unlike the FBI search in Walter, 
was found to not implicate a “legitimate” expectation of privacy. Id. at 123. 
 305. Jouvenal, TO FIND ALLEGED GOLDEN STATE KILLER, supra note 2, at 2. Officials 
also examined “police and commercial databases.” Id. While law enforcement’s reference to 
its own databases should not trigger a Fourth Amendment issue, the privacy concerns 
surrounding use of “commercial” databases would depend on the specifics involved 
in each particular visit. Id. 
 306. Winton, supra note 60. 
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and checking newspapers and census records,307 which would raise no 
Fourth Amendment red flags. This issue, commonly referred to as 
“standing,”308 involves the question of who precisely has the right to 
contest a particular Fourth Amendment violation.309 
One of the most significant cases on the issue of “standing,” or the 
right to contest a Fourth Amendment search, is Rakas v. Illinois, a case 
which altered even the language employed in this area of the law.310 In 
Rakas, officers, suspecting a stopped car of being involved in a robbery, 
ordered its occupants out of the vehicle.311 When Rakas and two others 
then exited the vehicle, the officers searched the car, discovering “a box of 
rifle shells in the glove compartment, which had been locked, and a 
sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat.”312 Rakas moved to 
suppress these items as recovered during an unlawful search.313 The trial 
court ruled Rakas lacked standing to contest the search because he, being 
merely a passenger, did not own the car and further did not claim 
ownership of the gun or shells.314 
Rakas described the “concept of standing” as focusing on “whether 
the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search as a basis for 
suppressing evidence was himself the ‘victim’ of the search or seizure.”315 
“Standing” involved two questions: “first, whether the proponent of a 
particular legal right has alleged “injury in fact,” and, second, whether the 
proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing 
his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties.”316 Rakas, however, was 
less than pleased with the “‘standing’ terminology”317 because such 
language caused the issue to be falsely seen as “theoretically distinct from 
the merits of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim.”318 The Court 
concluded that the “definition” of Fourth Amendment rights was “more 
 
 307. Jouvenal, supra note 2, at 2. 
 308. The Court, in Byrd v. United States, commented, “It is worth noting that most 
courts analyzing the question presented in this case . . . have described it as one of Fourth 
Amendment ‘standing.’” 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018). 
 309. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 130. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 130. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 132. 
 316. Id. at 139. 
 317. Id. at 133. 
 318. Id. 
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properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law 
than within that of standing.”319 
Rakas deemed Fourth Amendment rights as “personal rights” that 
could “not be vicariously asserted.”320 The Court ruled, “A person who is 
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of 
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or 
property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.321 
Only those “whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated” could 
seek exclusion of the evidence obtained from that violation.322 Rakas 
contested the search of the glove compartment and the space under the 
car’s seat, yet he did not claim that he had “any legitimate expectation of 
privacy” in these areas.323 Lacking a reasonable privacy expectation, Rakas 
necessarily lacked a Fourth Amendment right in the car, and therefore 
could not contest the police illegality. In terms that Rakas would have 
disapproved, he lacked “standing” to claim the officer’s search of the car 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
In the next case involving the right to contest a search of a vehicle, 
Byrd v. United States, the Court had mellowed its stance on the 
terminology of “standing” by noting, “The concept of standing in Fourth 
Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a 
person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place 
searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search.”324 In Byrd, 
Terrence Byrd and Latasha Reed drove in Byrd’s Honda to Budget car 
rental in New Jersey. Reed then entered the agency and rented a car while 
Byrd stayed outside in his Honda. After signing a rental contract that 
explicitly provided, “PERMITTING AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER TO 
OPERATE THE VEHICLE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RENTAL 
AGREEMENT,” Reed handed the rental’s keys to Byrd, who drove off in 
the rental car.325 Later, a Pennsylvania trooper stopped Byrd as he was 
driving the rental car to Pittsburgh.326 The officer noticed when he 
approached the car, Byrd was so nervous that he “was shaking and had a 
 
 319. Id. at 140. 
 320. Id. at 133–34. 
 321. Id. at 134. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 150, n. 17. 
 324. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1530. 
 325. Id. at 1524. 
 326. Id. 
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hard time obtaining his driver’s license.”327 Another officer then arrived at 
the scene.328 When the troopers learned Byrd was not listed as an 
authorized driver on the rental agreement, they told him they could search 
the car without consent. The resulting search of the car’s trunk revealed 
“body armor and 49 bricks of heroin,” exposing Byrd to federal drug 
charges.329 
When presented with this case, the Byrd Court asked, “Does a driver 
of a rental car have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car when he 
or she is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement?”330 
While noting that the legitimacy of privacy expectations “must have a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment,” Byrd identified two such 
sources: 1) “concepts of real or personal property law,” and 2) 
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”331 Relying 
on the “general property-based concept,” the Court determined that Byrd 
was the “sole occupant” of the car and therefore “could exclude others 
from it.”332 Byrd declared, “one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls 
property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by 
virtue of [the] right to exclude.”333 Acknowledging that Byrd “violated the 
rental agreement,” the Court dismissed this fact because, “As anyone who 
has rented a car knows, car-rental agreements are filled with long lists of 
restrictions.”334 “Few would contend,” urged the Court, that violating such 
provisions as driving on an unpaved road or while holding a cellphone, 
“has anything to do with a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
rental car.”335 Byrd therefore held, “the mere fact that a driver in lawful 
possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement 
will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.”336 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 1523. 
 330. Id. at 1527. Deciding whether Byrd had “his own Fourth Amendment rights 
infringed by the search” meant determining whether he had a “legitimate expectation of 
privacy” in the place searched. Id. at 1526. 
 331. Id. at 1527. The “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” will 
not be explored in this Article in light of the previous discussions regarding privacy 
expectations in supra Section B of Part IV and “widely shared social expectations” in supra 
Section C of Part IV. 
 332. Id. at 1527, 1528. 
 333. Id. at 1528. 
 334. Id. at 1529. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 1531. 
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Byrd, in applying property law principles to determine whether a 
person possessed the reasonable expectation of privacy to contest a search, 
offered another test that could be used to consider the admissibility of 
evidence obtained from genealogy sites. Through Byrd’s lens, asking 
whether a person has standing to challenge a government visit of a family 
member’s genealogy site amounts to inquiring whether that person has a 
property right enabling him or her to exclude others from the site. The 
design and operation of GEDmatch undermines any such ability to exclude. 
In its “Terms of Service and Privacy Policy,” GEDmatch alerts potential 
users, “GEDmatch exists to provide DNA and genealogy tools for 
comparison and research purposes.”337 The comparison and research that 
GEDmatch mentions are collaborative processes that can only work by 
sharing information. The sites’ very existence, along with the million 
uploads made on it, demonstrate the inability to exclude others.338 
GEDmatch further notes, “DNA and Genealogical research, by its very 
nature, requires the sharing of information. Because of that, users 
participating in this Site agree that their information will be shared with 
other users.”339 The site’s terms of service, in twice explicitly referencing 
sharing, again show a lack of property interest by a relative in excluding 
others. Finally, GEDmatch explains, “Raw DNA data uploaded to 
GEDmatch.Com (‘Raw Data’) remains the property of the person who 
uploaded it.”340 In this statement, the only property interest GEDmatch 
acknowledges is that of the person uploading the DNA, not the relatives 
who might contest the viewing of it. Under Byrd’s “general property-based 
concept,” without a right to exclude, one has no property interest, without a 
property interest, one has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
without such a privacy expectation, one has no standing.341 Since a relative 







 337. GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, https://www. 
gedmatch.c om/tos.htm (last modified May 20, 2018). 
 338. Jouvenal et al., supra note 62. 
 339. GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, https://www. 
gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last modified May 20, 2018). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1528. 
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Conclusion 
 
Facing the daunting realization that there are “200,000-plus cold cases 
in the United States,” Kenneth Mains, “founder of the American 
Investigative Society of Cold Cases,” has argued that any resource which 
helps close such cases “needs to be utilized.”342 The National District 
Attorneys Association’s Josh Marquis wondered, “Why in God’s name 
would we come up with a reason that we are not able to use” these genetic 
websites?343 While law enforcement is keenly aware of the potential 
“investigative goldmine” of these databases, the persons who use them 
“aren’t really thinking through the implications of creating this treasure 
trove of data that can be mined.”344 University of Michigan law professor 
Barbara McQuade has noted that for most people, DNA is so “very private, 
very personal” that “even if you have given it up to one of these third-party 
services, maybe there should be a higher level of security.”345 There thus 
exists a gap between the perceptions of investigators zealously pursuing 
criminals and laypersons who have not considered the full consequences of 
this rapidly advancing technology. It is in this gap that Fourth Amendment 
rights, not fully appreciated by those using genealogical websites, might 
fall. 
Further, full privacy protection from government use of genetic 
genealogy might be beyond the volitional power of any one individual. 
Those who, after educating themselves on every aspect of genealogical 
privacy, choose to forgo uploading their own DNA, might still find their 
genetic information probed by the government. “Even if we’ve never spit 
into a test tube, some of our genetic information may be public—and 
accessible to law enforcement.”346 There is no getting around the fact that 
any person, upon submitting DNA information to a public genealogy site, 
exposes the DNA of his or her relatives, even if “distant” or “far flung.”347 
This breach occurs regardless of the consent or even the knowledge of 
thousands. 
If confronted with the Fourth Amendment issues of genetic 
genealogy, the Court could address the concerns created by this new 
technology in a variety of ways. The Court could turn to its earlier case 
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involving DNA collection of arrestees entering custody, Maryland v. King. 
Such an approach would bear so little fruit, due to the narrowness of King’s 
ruling, that the Court would have to craft a new rule for the entirely 
separate issue of government collection of DNA information on the 
Internet.348 The Court could analyze genetic genealogy’s privacy issues by 
considering Carpenter’s latest application of the third-party doctrine.349 
The force of Carpenter’s reasoning would likely cause the Court to view 
genetic genealogy as so sophisticated and the information it handled as so 
sensitive that a government visit to a genealogy site would be deemed a 
Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant.350 The Court could consider 
a person’s uploading of DNA information as amounting to a grant of 
consent to search the portions of his or her genome held in common with 
relatives. Then, the third-party consent precedent’s “widely shared social 
expectations” would likely reject government use of DNA information 
without a warrant.351 Two other Fourth Amendment doctrines, Walter and 
Jacobsen’s “antecedent private search” rule352 and Byrd’s “general 
property-based concept” definition of standing, offer law enforcement with 
potential avenues for admission of genetic genealogy evidence.353 Should 
the Court deem a person’s upload of DNA information onto a genealogy 
site to be a prior private search, then Walter and Jacobsen would permit the 
government to explore this same genetic information—previously exposed 
by a private person—without a warrant. Finally, following Byrd’s 
reasoning, the government could avoid the exclusion of evidence obtained 
in visiting a genealogy site even if the warrantless download of genetic 
information was found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Since the family 
member could not exclude others from visiting the genealogy site, he or 
she could not establish a property interest sufficient to support standing to 
challenge the search in the first place.354 The Court’s decision about the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of warrantless government collection of 
genetic information from genealogy sites will thus turn on how it chooses 
to frame the question triggered by this new technology. When it comes to 
genetic genealogy, as with much else in the world of heredity, where you 
end up all depends on where you start. 
 
 348. King, 569 U.S. at 449, 462. 
 349. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
 352. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116. 
 353. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1528. 
 354. Id. 
[FINAL-FOR-TOM]DERY_GENETICGENEALOGY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2019  10:05 AM 
146 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2 
 
*** 
 
